Rethinking Scrutiny of Question of Fact under Writ Jurisdiction

Mere existence of a question of fact has long been considered an obstacle to Court’s jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution—a stance reinforced through numerous precedents¹ pronounced by the Apex Court and consistently upheld by the High Courts². This reflects a deep-rooted judicial hesitancy to delve into factual questions, clearly demarcating the Court’s role whilst exercising powers under Article 226. Does avoiding scrutiny of factual questions truly serve the interests of justice?

This article explores evolving judicial attitudes towards questions of fact and law. It delves into why courts have traditionally shied away from engaging with questions of fact and traces the emergence of exceptions that allow for a more nuanced analysis. By unpacking the underlying rationale of key judicial decisions, it reveals the broader implications of evolving interpretations, one that seeks to balance the need for judicial restraint with equitable outcomes.

As a norm, Writ Courts do not adjudicate matters involving disputed questions of fact in order to avoid entertaining petitions where an adequate efficacious remedy is available yet, not availed by the petitioner³. However, doing so without taking into consideration the unique circumstances of a case might inadvertently obstruct the pursuit of justice. As such the non-entertainment of petitions when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a self-imposed limitation rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy⁴. In each case the Court has to consider whether the party seeking relief has an alternative remedy which is equally efficacious by a suit, whether refusal to grant relief in a writ petition would amount to denying justice, whether the claim is based substantially upon consideration of evidence oral and documentary of a complicated nature and whether the case is otherwise fit for trial in exercise of the jurisdiction to issue high prerogative writs⁵ before dismissing the petition.

Disputed questions of fact are also turned down, as determining facts requires a prolonged trial-like inquiry—a function that lies outside the intended scope of Writ Courts. And so, in instances where a close examination of a disputed question of fact is warranted, the Court may direct the party claiming relief to initiate a suit⁶, for better appreciation of evidence.

In Gulabdas v. Assistant Collector, Customs⁷ the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that the Court is precluded from exercising its writ jurisdiction when a question of fact does not affect the enforcement of fundamental rights and calls for an examination of disputed facts and materials. Notably, Article 32 does not categorically prohibit the Court from considering questions of fact.

Similarly, there is no such rule barring the High Court from addressing issues of fact, in a writ petition.⁸ The High Court under Article 226 has jurisdiction to try both issues of fact and law.⁹ Nevertheless, when confronted with complex questions of fact that demand a detailed examination of evidence—necessitating recording oral testimony—the High Court may decline to hear the petition, acknowledging its limitations in conducting an extensive fact-finding trial. Further, a petition may also be dismissed if it is deemed frivolous, or if the nature of the claim is considered inappropriate, or on grounds that it is not maintainable against the party involved, or that dispute is unsuitable for writ jurisdiction, or for other similar reasons.¹⁰ Not every case warrants a dismissal merely on the grounds that it involves a disputed question of fact, as discussed above. The court is not powerless to determine such questions especially when facts can be easily substantiated by producing admissible documents¹¹.

In M/s A.P. Electrical Equipment Corporation v. The Tahsildar & Ors. etc.¹²the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that the mere existence of disputed questions of fact would not automatically oust the Court’s jurisdiction and affirmed that a mere claim as to the existence of a seriously disputed question of fact would not be a valid ground for dismissing a petition. Rejecting the contention that every petition involving disputed questions of fact must be dismissed, the Court held that such a rigid interpretation of powers under Article 226 is neither backed by law nor any precedents. It was further held that when facts are being disputed merely to create a ground for dismissing the writ petition, such contentions must be rejected as it is the duty of the Court to investigate disputed facts and record findings, when required, in the interest of justice.

Furthermore, the Apex Court clarified that whether a disputed question of fact needs to be examined depends largely on the specific nature of that question. The Court must determine precisely which facts ought to be determined to ensure justice is duly served. In instances where questions of fact present themselves as mixed question of law and fact—the reviewing court must assess whether established facts satisfy statutory criteria¹³. Unlike purely factual disputes, such cases require both factual analysis and legal interpretation, making it necessary for the Court to engage with the facts rather than dismissing the petition outright.

Conclusion

Courts have traditionally been cautious about engaging with disputed questions of fact under writ jurisdiction refraining from engaging in fact-intensive inquiries. However, rigidly rejecting petitions on this ground risks undermining justice. Judicial discretion plays a crucial role in assessing whether a case warrants intervention, especially when facts can be established through admissible evidence. Recent judgments reaffirm that courts are not powerless to examine factual disputes even under writ jurisdiction, when necessary, striking a balance between judicial restraint and the need for fair adjudication. The evolving jurisprudence ensures that Article 226 remains an effective remedy.

1. Sohan Lal v. Union of India, (1957 SCR 738), Thansingh Nathmal v. Superintendent of Taxes, (AIR 1964 SC 1419), A.V. Venkateswaran v. R.S. Wadhwani, (AIR 1963 SC 528), Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation, (2013) 5 SCC 470, Balkrishna Ram v. Union of India, (2020) 2 SCC 442.
2. See -Aryan Swarup Parida v. Union of India & Ors., 2025 LiveLaw (Ori) 10, Zahid Hussain Jan v. State of J&K, 2023 LiveLaw (JKL) 67, Sri Madarnanchi Rama Swamy Dharmasatram Private Trust v. The State of Andhra Pradesh, 2022 LiveLaw (AP) 48, Narender v. Secretary, Municipal Administration, Secretariat Buildings Hyderabad and Others, 2003 (5) ALD 448, Pithana Apparao v. State of A.P., AIR 1970 AP 318, M.L.Ravi v. Chief Election Commissioner& Ors. (Madras HC – W.P. No. 27375 of 2019 & 12684 of 2021), Hiralal Chhagan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, ILR (1968) 18 Raj 389.
3. State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, (AIR 1958 SC 86).
4. Union of India & Ors. v. Major General Shri Kant Sharma & Anr., (2015 6 SCC 773).
5. Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, (1971) 3 SCC 277.
6. State of Orissa v. Miss. Binapani Dei (Dr), (1967) 2 SCR 625,627.
7. AIR 1957 SC 737.
8. Om Prakash v. State of Haryana, (1971) 3 SCC 277.
9. A.S. Sindhu v. Union of India, (2024::PHHC::016846).
10. Gunwat Kaur v. Bhatinda Municipality, (AIR 1970 SC 602).
11. Atolchow Singh v. Chief Commissioner, (AIR 1968 Mani 4, 7).
12. (2025 INSC 274).
13. Bausch & Lomb v. United States C.I.T. 166, 169 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1997).